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We propose CoreTuLiP - the core of a trust management language based on
Logic Programming. CoreTuLiP is based on a subset of moded logic program-
ming, but enjoys the features of TM languages such as RT; in particular clauses
are issued by different authorities and stored in a distributed manner. We present
a lookup and inference algorithm which we prove to be correct and complete
w.r.t. the declarative semantics. CoreTuLiP enjoys uniform syntax and the well-
established semantics and is expressive enough to model scenarios which are hard
to deal with in RT.
1 Introduction
Trust management (TM) [5, 16, 7, 6, 10, 11, 13, 12, 17] is an approach to access control
in decentralised distributed systems where access control decisions are based on policy
statements issued by multiple principals, and stored in a distributed manner. Policy
statements are often digitally signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity; such
statements are sometimes called credentials or certificates, and – in many cases – can
be represented as datalog clauses. Indeed, like in logic programming, in TM credentials
often have to be combined together to provide a authorisation proof (e.g. a proof that a
given user has indeed access to a given resource).
One of the peculiar features of TM (w.r.t. classical decentralised access control,
but also w.r.t. logic programming) is that credentials may or may not be stored by the
authority who issues them, therefore one of the prominent problems of TM is that
of guaranteeing that – under reasonable circumstances – if there exists a proof of a
certain (authorisation) statement, then it is also possible to find the credentials needed
to construct the proof itself.
To date, one of the most successful TM systems is the RT family, defined by Li,
Winsborough and Mitchell [12, 13]. This family of languages enjoys a well-defined
LP-based declarative semantics, syntax similar to that of SDSI [6], and offers the pos-
sibility of storing credentials either by the issuer (the authority issuing them) and/or
by the subject (the entity the credential “refers to”). The location where the credential
∗This work was carried out within the Freeband I-Share project.
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is stored is determined by the so-called type of the credential. Li et. al show that if
all credentials are well typed then there exists a terminating credential chain discovery
algorithm which determines whether a given statement is valid in the present state.
Although the RT family is successful in achieving its goals, we believe that it
presents drawbacks which are worth investigating and improving. In particular, RT
syntax is inflexible to the extent that to accommodate natural things such as separation
of duty etc., one has to resort to a number of rather artificial extensions (RT1 until RTD,
and RTT ), which are difficult to grasp and use. Secondly, it cannot be linked naturally
with external languages. Finally, while it enjoys a declarative reading, this reading does
not reflect anything of the crucial type information.
One could speculate that to solve the above problems one should simply translate
RT into Logic Programming, and then use the latter to specify and prove authorisa-
tion statements. This is however inaccurate, as this translation would lose the essential
elements that make RT a trust management language, in particular the information con-
cerning where credentials should be stored and how they can be found when needed,
which is essential in TM.
In this paper we present CoreTuLiP, which is the stripped-down version of the
TuLiP (Trust management system based on Logic Programming) system we are devel-
oping at the University of Twente in the context of the I-Share project [9]. CoreTuLiP,
is basically a subset of (function-free) moded logic programming, with the essential ad-
ditional feature that the clauses are not stored at a central authority, but are distributed
across the different principals involved in the system. The mode information deter-
mines where a clause will be stored and a form of well-modedness is used to guarantee
that, as the computation progresses, enough information is available to find the clauses
needed to build a proof of the query being fired. Since credentials are distributed,
CoreTuLiP is not amenable to SLD resolution; like RT, CoreTuLiP requires a mix of
top-down and bottom up reasoning. Here, we present a terminating algorithm which
is able to answer well-moded queries, together with a a soundness and completeness
result (w.r.t. the standard LP semantics under the assumptions that all clauses are ag-
gregated in one place). Finally, we show that RT0, the core language of the RT family
is basically equivalent to a subset of CoreTuLiP; this equivalence is demonstrated also
by taking into account the type of RT credentials, and thus the location where creden-
tials are stored. Doing so, we prove that it is possible to define a true trust management
language which is as expressive as RT0 also in terms of credential distribution without
giving up the established LP formalism.
CoreTuLiP, being based on LP, has a much more flexible underlying syntax than
RT, and can easily accommodate extensions without changes to the syntax. Because of
this, we believe and we argue that it will form a good basis for a language which will
be much more expressive than RT while enjoying RT’s properties as a TM language.
To support our arguments, we show that it is possible to express thresholds and sepa-
ration of duties (which require special addition to RT0) without leaving the syntax of
CoreTuLiP.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the basics of moded
Logic Programming. In Section 3 we introduce CoreTuLiP. In Section 4 we describe
LIAR, the Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm, which checks whether a fact is entailed
by a set of CoreTuLiP credentials. We also show that LIAR is sound and complete
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w.r.t. the standard LP semantics. In Section 5 we compare RT0 with CoreTuLiP. Fi-
nally, we conclude the paper in Section 6 and propose future research in Section 6.
Some proofs are reported in the Appendix, which is included solely for the reader’s
convenience. Should the paper be accepted we are going to remove the appendix and
make it available as Technical Report.
2 Preliminaries on Logic Programs
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terminology and the basic results of
the semantics of logic programs [1, 2, 14]. Here we refer to function-free (Datalog-
like) logic programs and we adopt the notation of [2] in the fact that we use boldface
characters to denote sequences of objects; therefore t denotes a sequence of terms while
B is a sequence of atoms, i.e. a query (following [2], queries are simply conjunctions
of atoms, possibly empty). We denote atoms by A,B,H, . . . , queries by A,B,C, . . . ,
clauses by c, d, . . . , and programs by P . The empty query is denoted by .
For any syntactic object (e.g., atom, clause, query) o, we denote by Var(o) the
set of variables occurring in o. Given a substitution σ = {x1/t1, ..., xn/tn} we say
that {x1, . . . , xn} is its domain (denoted by Dom(σ)) and that Var({t1, ..., tn}) is its
range (denoted by Ran(σ)). Further, we denote by Var(σ) = Dom(σ) ∪ Ran(σ). If,
t1, ..., tn is a permutation of x1, ..., xn then we say that σ is a renaming. The composi-
tion of substitutions is denoted by juxtaposition (θσ(X) = σ(θ(X))). We say that an
syntactic object (e.g., an atom) o is an instance of o′ iff for some σ, o = o′σ, further
o is called a variant of o′, written o ≈ o′ iff o and o′ are instances of each other. A
substitution θ is a unifier of objects o and o′ iff oθ = o′θ. We denote by mgu(o, o′) any
most general unifier (mgu, in short) of o and o′.
Computations are sequences of derivation steps. The non-empty query q : A, B,C
and a clause c : H ← B (renamed apart w.r.t. q) yield the resolvent (A,B,C)θ,
provided that θ = mgu(B,H). A derivation step is denoted by A, B,C θ=⇒P,c
(A,B,C)θ. c is called its input clause, andB is called the selected atom of q. A deriva-
tion is obtained by iterating derivation steps. A maximal sequence δ := B0
θ1=⇒P,c1
B1
θ2=⇒P,c2 · · ·Bn
θn+1
=⇒P,cn+1 Bn+1 · · · of derivation steps is called an SLD deriva-
tion of P ∪{B0} provided that for every step the standardisation apart condition holds,
i.e., the input clause employed at each step is variable disjoint from the initial query B0
and from the substitutions and the input clauses used at earlier steps. If the program
P is clear from the context and the clauses c1, . . . , cn+1, . . . are irrelevant, then we
drop the reference to them. If δ is maximal and ends with the empty query (Bn = )
then the restriction of θ to the variables of B is called its computed answer substitu-
tion (c.a.s., for short). The length of a (partial) derivation δ, denoted by len(δ), is the
number of derivation steps in δ.
Moded Programs Informally speaking, a mode indicates how the arguments of a re-
lation should be used, i.e. which are the input and which are the output positions of
each atom, and allow one to derive properties such as absence of run-time errors for
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Prolog built-ins, absence of floundering for programs with negation [4]. Most compil-
ers encourage the user to specify a mode declaration.
Definition 2.1 (Mode) Consider an n-ary predicate symbol p. By a mode for p we
mean a function mp from {1, . . . , n} to {In,Out}.
If mp(i) = In (resp. Out), we say that i is an input (resp. output) position of
p (with respect to mp). We assume that each predicate symbol has a unique mode
associated to it; multiple modes may be obtained by simply renaming the predicates.
We use the notation (X1, . . . , Xn) to indicate the mode m in which m(i) = Xi. For
instance, (In,Out) indicates the mode in which the first (resp. second) position is an
input (resp. output ) position. To benefit from the advantage of modes, programs are
required to be well-moded [4], which means that they have to respect some correctness
conditions relating the input arguments to the output arguments. We denote by In(A)
(resp. Out(A)) the sequence of terms filling in the input (resp. output) positions of A,
and by VarIn(A) (resp. VarOut(A)) the set of variables occupying the input (resp.
output) positions of A.
Definition 2.2 (Well-Moded) A clause H ← B1, . . . , Bn is well-moded if for all
i ∈ [1, n]
VarIn(Bi) ⊆
⋃i−1
j=1 VarOut(Bj) ∪ VarIn(H), and
VarOut(H) ⊆
⋃n
j=1 VarOut(Bj) ∪ VarIn(H).
A query A is well-moded iff the clause H ← A is well-moded, where H is any (dummy)
atom of zero arity. A program is well-moded if all of its clauses are well-moded.
Note that the first atom of a well-moded query is ground in its input positions and
a variant of a well-moded clause is well-moded. The following Lemma, due to [3],
shows the “persistence” of the notion of well-modedness.
Lemma 2.3 An SLD-resolvent of a well-moded query and a well-moded clause that is
variable-disjoint with it, is well-moded. 
As a consequence of Lemma 2.3 we have the following well-known property [3].
Corollary 2.4 Let P be a well-moded program and A be a well-moded query. Then
for every computed answer σ of A in P , Aσ is ground. 
A straightforward consequence of this Corollary is the following one:
Corollary 2.5 Let H ← B1, . . . , Bn be a clause in a well-moded program P . If A is
a well-moded atom such that γ0 = mgu(A,H) and for every i ∈ [1, j], j ∈ [1, n− 1]




In CoreTuLiP there are two types of atoms: (user-defined) credentials and built-in con-
straints. To distinguish between the two we assume the presence of a set of certificate
predicates (for credentials) and of a disjoint with it set of constraint predicates. In
CoreTuLiP,
• certificate predicates have exactly two arguments;
• in a certificate atom we call the term filling the first argument the issuer, and the
one filling the second argument the recipient.
(the relations between these notions and the notions of issuer and subject used in RT
are discussed in Section 5). In the full version we are going to have certificates with
more arguments and user defined predicates as well. These additions are, however,
immaterial for this paper.
For example, the certificate student(ut, alice) is issued by ut (University of Twente),
and has alice as the recipient. With this certificate, ut states that alice belongs to the
student set. In a practical setting, this certificate is signed by ut, and ut and alice are
placeholders for the implementation dependent identifiers (like public keys or URIs)
referring to the University of Twente and Alice respectively. In TM, certificates are
always issued by some authority (for the sake of simplicity here we identify authorities
with the set of ground terms). It is therefore natural to expect the issuer of the head of
a rule to be a ground term.
Definition 3.1 Let cl : H ← B1, . . . , Bn be a clause. We say that cl is well-formed
if it is well-moded and issuer(H) is a ground term.
Decentralised Storage A peculiar feature of trust management systems is that cer-
tificates are stored in a distributed way. For instance, the credential student(ut, alice)
which is issued by ut could be stored by either ut or alice. Storing it by alice has the
advantage that alice does not have to fetch the credential at ut every time she needs
it, which in a highly distributed system may be costly. We call the depositary of a
credential the authority where the credential is stored. In CoreTuLiP, it is the mode
of the credential’s head which determines its depositary. Furthermore, in CoreTuLiP
we allow only one mode per relation symbol, so credentials will be stored at one place
only; by allowing multiple modes we lift this limitation in the extended system.
Certificate symbols have three legal modes: (In , In), (In,Out), and (Out , In).
The reason why the mode (Out ,Out) is considered illegal is that it would allow queries
with completely uninstantiated arguments like student(X,Y ), in which neither the is-
suer nor the recipient is specified. Unlike in LP, such queries cannot be answered in a
TM system because the system does not know where to look for relevant credentials,
which could be issued and stored by any authority. By requiring that at least one of
the arguments be ground, and that that the credentials be traceable (see below) we will
be able to find the credentials we need to construct the proofs we need. For constraint
predicates, on the other hand, the only legal mode is the one all-input (In , . . . , In).
The mode of a predicate determines where the credentials defining it are stored.
For instance, if mode(student) is either (In , In) or (In ,Out), then the above credential
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will be stored at ut, otherwise (if the mode is (Out , In)), alice will store it. Storing
the credential at some other place would make it unfindable. The definition below
generalises this concept.
Definition 3.2 (Traceable, Depositary) We say that a clause cl : H ← B1, . . . , Bn
is traceable if it is well-formed and one of the following conditions hold:
1. mode(H) ∈ {(In, In), (In ,Out)} – in this case issuer(H) is the depositary of
the rule,
2. mode(H) = (Out , In), and recipient(H)(= In(H)) contains a ground term -
in this case recipient(H) is the depositary of the rule,
3. mode(H) = (Out , In) and recipient(H) contains a variable. In this case we
require that there exists a prefix B1, . . . , Bk of the body such that
• mode(B1) = . . . = mode(Bk) = (Out , In),
• In(H) = In(B1),
• In(Bi+1) = Out(Bi), and is a variable, for i ∈ [1, k − 1],
• Out(Bk) contains a ground term,
In this case, we say that issuer(Bk)(= Out(Bk)) is the depositary of the rule.
The third case is a bit complex, but it has the advantage of permitting the storage of a
credential at a third party (neither the issuer, not the recipient).
We can now introduce the concept of a state.
Definition 3.3 A state P is a finite collection of pairs (a, Pa) where Pa is a collection
of traceable credentials and a is the depositary of these credentials.
The declarative semantics of a state is simply given in terms of logic programming as
follows (where for simplicity we assume that all constraints are user-defined)
Definition 3.4 Let P be the state {(a1, P1), . . . , (an, Pn)}, and A be an atom
• We denote by P (P) the set of clauses P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pn. We call P (P) the
LP-counterpart of state P .
• We say that A is true in state P iff P (P)∪C |= A, where C is a first order theory
determining the meaning of credential predicates.
The following example clarifies the use of modes and their influence on the creden-
tial storage.
Example 3.5 To access a project document at the University of Twente (UT) one must
be either a project member and a Ph.D. student at the UT or at one of the partner univer-
sities, or be approved by two different assistant professors at the UT. John and Jeroen
are assistant professors at the UT. John says that a project member from one of the
partner universities can access the document if she is approved by at least one project
member who is also an associate professor at that university. Jeroen approves anyone
who is also approved by a project leader at the UT. Sandro is a project leader at the
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(c1) access_document(ut, X) :− (c4) approve_access(jeroen, X) :−
project_member(ut, X), approve_access(L,X),
prof(ut, A1), project_leader(ut, L).
prof(ut, A2), (c5) project_leader(ut, sandro).
A1 6= A2, (c6) phd_student(ut,marcin).
approve_access(A1, X), (c7) approve_access(sandro, rico).
approve_access(A2, X). approve_access(jeffrey, rico).
(c2) access_document(ut, X) :− (c8) associate_prof(tud, jeffrey).
phd_student(P,X), (c9) project_member(ut, john).
project_partner(ut, P ), project_member(ut, charles).
project_member(P,X). prof(ut, john).
(c3) approve_access(john, X) :− prof(ut, jeroen).
approve_access(A,X), project_partner(ut, ut).
associate_prof(P,A), (c10) project_partner(ut, tud).
project_partner(ut, P ), project_member(tud, jeffrey).
project_member(P,A), project_member(tud, rico).
project_member(P,X).
Figure 1: Credentials of Example 3.5.
UT. Figure 1 shows the credentials modelling the scenario. The modes are as follows:
access_document:(In, In), project_member:(In, In), prof:(In,Out), and the remain-
ing predicates are moded (Out , In). Therefore, credentials c1 − c4 and credentials c9
are stored at ut. Credential c5 is stored by sandro, c6 by marcin, the two credentials c7
by rico, and c8 by jeffrey. tud stores all the credentials c10.
4 The Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR)
The goal of an authorisation system is to check whether a fact is true in a given state.
Since the state P can be very large and distributed across different agents, it is essential
to have an algorithm which takes care of computing whether a given query is true in
P (P) without having to collect the entire P (P). An extra difficulty comes from the
fact that clauses might easily be mutually recursive, and that cases 2 and 3 of Definition
3.2 make it impossible to follow a straightforward top-down reasoning.
In this section we present a suitable algorithm. Before we proceed we need the
following definitions.
Definition 4.1 (Connected) We say that two atomsA andB that have mode (Out, In)
are connected if recipient(A) is ground and recipient(A) = recipient(B).
Notation: Let A be an atom and S be a set of atoms. In the sequel we adopt the
following notational conventions:
(i) We write A ∼∈ S iff ∃A′ ∈ S, such that A′ ≈ A.
(ii) We write A
∼
/∈ S iff ∄A′ ∈ S such that A′ ≈ A.
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(iii) We write A θ→֒ S iff ∃A′ ∼∈ S standardised apart w.r.t. A such that γ =
mgu(A,A′) and Aθ ≈ Aγ.
Definition 4.2 Let A be an atomic well-moded query. We define the Lookup and In-
ference AlgoRithm (LIAR) which given a state P and a query A as an input returns
the (possibly empty) sets of atoms FACTSTACK and GOALSTACK. The algorithm is
reported in Figure 4.
In the description of LIAR we assume that dummy is a reserved predicate symbol,
with mode (Out, In). Statements in boxes are optional and included only for optimi-
sation purposes. The algorithm extends naturally to queries containing more than one
atom.
We now prove that LIAR algorithm is sound and complete w.r.t. the standard LP
semantics, i.e. the centralised algorithm based on the SLD resolution. We need the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 Let P be a state and FACTSTACK be the result of the algorithm execution
for some well-moded query. Let A be an atom in FACTSTACK. Then A is ground.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The soundness result is rather straightforward.
Theorem 4.4 (soundness) Let P be a state and FACTSTACK be the result of executing
LIAR on P and a well-moded query. Then ∀A ∈ FACTSTACK, P (P) |= A.
Proof. It is easy to see that, by construction, if an atom A is added to FACTSTACK,
then CLSTACK |= A. Since ∀c ∈ CLSTACK c is an instance of a clause c′ ∈ P (P), it
follows that P (P) |= A. 
The following completeness result guarantees among other things that – after exe-
cuting LIAR on a stateP and some well-moded query – for any goalA ∈ GOALSTACK




Theorem 4.5 (completeness) Let P be a state and then FACTSTACK,GOALSTACK
be the result of executing LIAR on P and a given well-moded goal. Then ∀C ∈
GOALSTACK, if ∃ a successful SLD derivation δ : C θ−→P (P)  thenC θ→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 CoreTuLiP vs. RT0
In this section we are going to compare CoreTuLiP with the well-established RT0 trust
management language. We are going to show that – in most respects – CoreTuLiP is
at least as expressive as RT0. To this end, we first present a slightly simplified (yet
expressively equivalent) version of RT0 as given in [13]: A principal is a uniquely
identified individual or process. A principal can define a role, which is indicated by a
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INPUT : A. /* A is the initial atomic query */
Init:
CLSTACK : {A ← A} ;
FACTSTACK : ∅ ;
GOALSTACK : ∅ ;
SATISFIED = FALSE ;
VISITED = ∅ ;
REPEAT
Phase 1 (Top-down resolution):
CHOOSE:
c : H ← B, C,D ∈ CLSTACK and
B
′ ⊆ FACTSTACK, such that the following conditions hold:
(i) B and B′ unify with mgu θ,




(iv) IF mode(C) = (Out, In) THEN recipient(Cθ) /∈ VISITED ENDIF
ADD Cθ to GOALSTACK;
IF mode(C) ∈ {(In,Out), (In, In)}THEN
FETCH at issuer(Cθ) all clauses {c1, . . . , cn} whose head unifies
with Cθ with mgus {γ1, . . . , γn} respectively ;
FOR EACH ciγi ∈ {c1γ1, . . . , cnγn}DO
IF ciγi
∼
/∈ CLSTACK THEN ADD ciγi to CLSTACK ENDIF
END FOR EACH
ELSEIF mode(C) = (Out, In) THEN
FETCH all clauses {c1, . . . , cn} stored at recipient(Cθ) whose head has mode (Out, In) ;
ADD recipient(Cθ) to VISITED;
FOR EACH ci ∈ {c1, . . . , cn}DO
IF ci
∼
/∈ CLSTACK THEN ADD ci to CLSTACK ENDIF
END FOR EACH
ENDIF
Phase 2 (Bottom-up model-building):
REPEAT
CHOOSE: H ← B ∈ CLSTACK and B′ ⊆ FACTSTACK,
such that B and B′ unify with mgu θ ;
IF Hθ /∈ FACTSTACK THEN ADD Hθ to FACTSTACK ENDIF;
IF mode(H) = (Out, In) AND issuer(Hθ) /∈ VISITED THEN
ADD to CLSTACK the clause:
dummy(X, issuer(Hθ)) ← dummy(X, issuer(Hθ))
ENDIF
UNTIL nothing can be added to FACTSTACK;
IF A is ground and A ∈ FACTSTACK THEN SATISFIED = TRUE ENDIF
UNTIL SATISFIED OR nothing can be added to FACTSTACK and CLSTACK;
OUTPUT = FACTSTACK;
Figure 2: The Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR)
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principal’s name followed by a role name, separated by a dot. For instance a.r, and
alice.pictures are roles. We use names starting with a lowercase letter (sometimes with
subscripts) to indicate role names. (Differently from [13], for the sake of uniformity,
principals are denoted by names starting with a lowercase, typically, a, b, d.) A role
denotes a set of principals – the members of the role. To indicate which principals
populate a role, RT0 allows a principal to issue four kind of statements:
• Simple Member: a.r ← d. “a asserts that d is a member of a.r.”
• Simple Inclusion: a.r ← b.r1. “a asserts that a.r includes (all members of)
b.r1.”
• Linking Inclusion: a.r ← a.r1.r2. “a asserts that a.r includes b.r2 for every b
that is a member of a.r1.”
• Intersection Inclusion: a.r ← b1.r1 ∩ b2.r2. “a asserts that a.r includes every
principal who is a member of both b1.r1 and b2.r2.”
An RT policy (indicated by S) is a set of RT statements. Its semantics is defined by
translating it into a semantic program, SP(S), which is a Prolog program with only one
ternary predicate m. Intuitively, m(a, r, d) indicates that d is a member of the role a.r.
Given an RT statement c, the semantic program of c, SP(c), is defined as follows:
SP(a.r ← d)) = m(a, r, d).
SP((a.r ← b.r1)) = m(a, r,X) :− m(b, r1, X).
SP((a.r ← a.r1.r2)) = m(a, r,X) :− m(a, r1, Y ),m(Y, r2, X).
SP((a.r ← b1.r1 ∩ b2.r2)) = m(a, r,X) :− m(b1, r1, X),m(b2, r2, X).
SP extends to the set of statements in the obvious way: SP(S) = {SP(c) | c ∈ S}.
Finally, given an RT policy S, the semantics of a role a.r is defined in terms of atoms
entailed by the semantic program: [[a.r]]SP(S) = {d |SP(S) |= m(a, r, d)}.
The type system of RT0 To ensure traceability, RT0 comes with a type system [13].
In the original presentation, each role name has two types: an issuer-side type and a
subject-side type. Here – also for the sake of simplicity – we assume that each role has
just one of the following three type values: issuer-traces-all (ITA), issuer-traces-def
(ITD), and subject-traces-all (STA). To extend the results we present here to the full
version (i.e., including all possible combinations of RT types) we need to extend Core
TuLiP in a straightforward by allowing predicates with multiple modes.
Concerning storage, if a role name r is issuer-traces-all or issuer-traces-def, then
principal a has to store all the credentials defining a.r. When a role name r is subject-
traces-all then for any credential of the form a.r ← e, every subject of this credential
must store this credential. The successful discovery requires that each credential in the
policy S be well-typed. For the sake of simplicity, we use the following definition of
well typed credentials (equivalent to [13]).
Definition 5.1 Let c be an RT0 credential. We say that c is well typed iff the combina-
tion of type value assignments appears as a valid entry in Table 1.
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a.r ← b.r1
r1 ITA ITD STA
ITA OK
r ITD OK OK OK
STA OK
a.r ← a.r1.r2
r1 ITA ITD STA
r2 ITA ITD STA ITA ITD STA ITA ITD STA
ITA OK
r ITD OK OK OK OK OK
STA OK
a.r ← b1.r1 ∩ b2.r2
r1 ITA ITD STA
r2 ITA ITD STA ITA ITD STA ITA ITD STA
ITA OK OK OK OK OK
r ITD OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
STA OK OK OK OK OK
Table 1: Well Typed RT0 credentials.
For example, take the credential c : a.r ← a.r1.r2 and assume first that type(r)
and type(r1) is ITD, and type(r2) is STA. Then, after checking with Table 1, we see
that c is well typed w.r.t. this type value assignment. On the other hand, if type(r) =
type(r1) = type(r2) = ITD, then c is not well typed as there is no valid entry for this
type value assignment in Table 1. Note that simple member credentials (of the form
a.r ← a) are always well-typed.
Three Sorts of Goals If the set of credentials S is well-typed then there exists a
terminating algorithm supporting three sorts of goals.
1. “given a.r, list all principals in [[a.r]]SP(S)”; this goal can be answered provided
that r is issuer-traces-all.
2. “given a.r and b, check if b is a member of [[a.r]]SP(S)”; this goal can be an-
swered in all cases.
3. “given b, check list all roles a.r such that b is a member of [[a.r]]SP(S)”; this
goal can be answered only partially: given b the system is able to find all subject
traceable roles a.r such that b is a member of [[a.r]]SP(S).
5.1 Translating RT0 into CoreTuLiP
We now demonstrate that CoreTuLiP is – in most cases – more expressive than RT0 by
showing that an arbitrary RT0 policy can be translated in a straightforward way into an
equivalent CoreTuLiP state. First, we define a mapping T from RT0 to CoreTuLiP.
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Definition 5.2 Let c be an RT0 credential. Then T (c) is defined as follows:
T (a.r ← d) = r(a, d).
T (a.r ← b.r1) = r(a,X) :− r1(b,X).
T (a.r ← a.r1.r2) =
{
r(a,X) :− r2(Y,X), r1(a, Y ). if type(r1) 6= ITA,
r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r2(Y,X). otherwise.
T (a.r ← b1.r1 ∩ b2.r2) =
{
r(a,X) :− r2(b2, X), r1(b1, X). if type(r1) 6= ITA,
r(a,X) :− r1(b1, X), r2(b2, X). otherwise.
Concerning the mode of the predicates, we have: if the RT0 type of r is ITA then the
mode of r in T (c) is (In,Out), if the RT0 type of r is ITD then the mode of r in T (c)
is (In, In), and if the RT0 type of r is STA then the mode of r in T (c) is (Out, In). 
The following theorem shows that from the view point of the declarative semantics S
and T (S) are equivalent (recall that m is the fixed predicate symbol used in SP(S)).
Theorem 5.3 Let S be an RT0 policy. Then SP(S) |= m(a, r, d) iff T (S) |= r(a, d).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above statement proves that each RT policy can be translated into a declara-
tively equivalent CoreTuLiP state. Now, to prove the full equivalence we still have to
prove two things, namely that (a) if an RT credential is stored at principal a then its
corresponding CoreTuLiP statement is stored at a as well and that (b) the CoreTuLiP
system can answer the same goals the RT system can. We start with the following:
Proposition 5.4 Let c be an RT0 credential.
(a) if c is stored at a then T (c) is also stored at a.
(b) if c is a well typed then T (c) is traceable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
At last, we have to show how RT goals can be transformed into (legal, i.e., well-
moded) CoreTuLiP queries. Since RT does not have a formal notation to express goals
we have to be a bit verbose.
Remark 5.5 (Translating RT goals) Let S be a well-typed RT0 policy and T (S) its
CoreTuLiP equivalent. Let us consider the different sorts of goals supported by RT.
Sort 1: the general goal of this sort is “given a.r, list all principals in [[a.r]]SP(S)”.
This is translated into the query r(a,X). Notice this goal can be answered in RT only
if the role r has type ITA. But in this case the mode of r in T (S) is (I,O), and the
query r(a,X) is well-moded w.r.t. it. Therefore, we can conclude that goals of sort 1
can be safely expressed in CoreTuLiP.
Sort 2: the general goal of this sort is “given a.r and b, check if b is a member of
[[a.r]]SP(S)”. This is translated into the query r(a, b), which being ground is always
well-moded. Therefore, we can conclude that goals of sort 2 can be safely expressed in
CoreTuLiP.
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Sort 3: the general goal of this sort is “given b, list all a.r such that b is a member of
[[a.r]]SP(S)”. Such goals have no corresponding CoreTuLiP translation. The technical
reason behind this limitation is purely of syntactic nature: the translation would be
higher-order query (X(Y, b), where X and Y are variables). There are two reasons
why we believe that in practice this limitation of CoreTuLiP w.r.t. RT is hardly relevant
in practice: first, RT allows to express the query, but it is not able to give a complete
answer anyhow: it can only find all such a.r which are also subject traceable. Secondly
(also because RT is not able to provide a full answer), this kind of goals is not used in
practice on their own, but only as subgoals of Sort 2 goals. 
The syntactic inability of CoreTuLiP to express goals of sort 3 is actually a conscious
design choice we made to keep the syntax manageable (to express this sort goals we
would need a mode “polymorphic” mode system in which the actual mode of an atom
does not only depend on its predicate symbol but also on some of its arguments). In-
deed, our LIAR algorithm would be able to answer such queries as well.
Summarising, Theorem 5.3, Proposition 5.4, and Remark 5.5 allow us to say that
CoreTuLiP is at least as expressive as RT0, with the small exception of sort 3 goals.
In proving this, we have made the restrictive assumption that RT0 role name has just
one of the following three types: ITA (issuer-traces-all), ITD (issuer-traces-def), or
STA (subject-traces-all). The extension to the full version (i.e., including all possible
combinations of RT types) can be done in a straightforward way by extending Core
TuLiP so that it allows predicates with multiple modes.
5.2 A Flexible Syntax
As we said already, CoreTuLiP is simply the core language of the TM system we are
developing. The full language will allow credentials with more than two arguments
and user defined predicates. Nevertheless, CoreTuLiP is already expressive enough to
express complex policies (like thresholds or separation of duty) that in RT require the
adoption of special operators (which are present in more expressive members of the RT
family RT1, RT2, RTT , or RTD).
We now want to give a flavour of the syntactic difficulties one encounters with RT
when expressing less than trivial statements. Consider the following statement taken
from [12] “a says that an entity is a member of a.r if one member of a.r1 and two
different members of a.r2 all say so”. This policy cannot be expressed in RT0, and
to express this in RT one needs to use the so-called manifold roles, which extend the
notion of roles by allowing role members to be collections of entities (rather than just
principals). This is done inRT T by defining the operators⊙ and⊗. A type-5 credential
of the form a.r ← b1.r1⊙b2.r2 says that {s1∪s2} is a member of a.r if s1 is a member
of b1.r1 and s2 is a member of b2.r2. A type-6 credential a.r ← b1.r1 ⊗ b2.r2 has a
similar meaning, but it additionally requires that s1∩s2 = ∅. With these two additional
types of credential one can express the above statement as follows:
a.r ← a.r4.r
a.r4 ← a.r1 ⊙ a.r3
a.r3 ← a.r2 ⊗ a.r2
13
In CoreTuLiP, on the other hand, this policy can be expressed quite naturally with the
following oneliner:
r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r(Y,X), r2(a, Z1), r2(a, Z2), Z1 6= Z2, r(Z1, X), r(Z2, X).
Notably, to express this we don’t have to use manifold-like structures which are, in our
opinion, rather hard to grasp.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce CoreTuLiP, a true Trust Management Language which en-
joys the advantages of LP syntax and of its declarative semantics. CoreTuLiP form
the basis for the TuLiP TM language we are developing at the UT (which will include
user-defined predicates and will enjoy of most features of moded logic programs, in-
cluding interface with other languages, debugging facilities etc). The main purpose of
CoreTuLiP to provide a theoretical basis for the further developments.
CoreTuLiP enjoys the advantages of trust management languages: for instance
statements may be issued by multiple authorities and be stored by authorities differ-
ent than the issuing one. To deal with the problem of finding the credentials when
needed for a proof we define the notion of traceable credentials and present a Lookup
and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR), which we show to be correct and complete w.r.t. the
standard declarative semantics.
We also compare CoreTuLiP with RT0 and show that each RT0 credentials and
goals translates in a straightforward way into Core TuLiP (with the small exception of
sort 3 goals).
The theoretical relevance of this paper is that we show that it is possible to define
a true TM language without leaving the well-established LP formalism. The practical
relevance lies in the much greater flexibility, extendibility and accessibility that LP lan-
guage enjoy with respect to – for instance – RT. As we have discussed, to accommodate
various needs, the language RT0 has developed a relatively large number of extensions,
which are in our opinion often hard to grasp. We thought that this was the price we
had to pay to have a true TM language, but CoreTuLiP shows that this can be done
otherwise.
Future work CoreTuLiP can be extended in several directions. First we plan to in-
vestigate extending CoreTuLiP to support non-stratified negation. This is connected to
our previous work on RT⊖[15], where we extend RT0 with negation-in-context. Sec-
ondly, we are going to add support for integrity constraints for TM systems [8]. We also
plan to provide an implementation for CoreTuLiP, possibly supporting the XACML
standard.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Pieter Hartel and Jeroen Doumen from
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Appendix
In this appendix we include the proofs of various theorems from the paper. The ap-
pendix is provided solely for the reader’s convenience. Should the paper be accepted
we are going to remove the appendix and make it available as Technical Report.
Lemma 4.3 Let P be a state and FACTSTACK be the result of the algorithm execution
for some well-moded query. Let A be an atom in FACTSTACK. Then A is ground.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of FACTSTACK. The basic case is
trivial as FACTSTACK is empty.
Now, assume that FACTSTACK contains only ground atoms. We are proving that each
time a new atom is added to FACTSTACK, it is ground. Notice that an atom is added
to FACTSTACK as the result of the bottom-up evaluation of the facts in FACTSTACK
and a clause selected from CLSTACK. We have then two cases: (1) the clause selected
from CLSTACK in Phase 2 of the algorithm has empty body, (2) the clause selected
from CLSTACK in Phase 2 of the algorithm has non-empty body.
Case 1: The clause selected from CLSTACK has empty body.
In such a case, a fact can be added to FACTSTACK only if it is already in CLSTACK.
Let H. be a clause selected from CLSTACK. Recall that ∀C ∈ GOALSTACK, C is
well-moded.
1. mode(H) ∈ {(In, In), (In,Out)}.
If H. ∈ CLSTACK then there must be some C in GOALSTACK, such that ∃θ =
mgu(H,C) and ∃H ′. ∈ P such that H ′ is stored at issuer(C), H = H ′θ,
and θ = mgu(H ′, C). But, by Definition 3.4 (State) all clauses in a state P
are traceable, so that ∀G ∈ GOALSTACK and ∀A. ∈ P such that mode(G) ∈
{(In, In), (In ,Out)}, A. is stored at issuer(G), and ∃γ = mgu(A,G), Aγ is
ground and will be added to CLSTACK during Phase 1 of the algorithm. Then,
as a special case of the observation above, H must be ground.
2. mode(H) = (Out , In).
If H. ∈ CLSTACK then there must be some C in GOALSTACK such that
mode(C) = (Out , In), ∃c ∈ P such that c is stored at recipient(C), and H. = c.
But, by Definition 3.2 (Traceable, Depositary) and by the fact that every traceable
clause is well-formed, ∀G ∈ GOALSTACK such that mode(G) = (Out , In) and
∀D. ∈ P such that D is connected to C, D. is ground. Then, as a special case,
H. must also be ground.
Case 2: The clause selected from CLSTACK has non-empty body.
When the clause selected from CLSTACK has non-empty body, a fact can be added to
FACTSTACK only be the means of the bottom-up evaluation in Phase 2 of the algorithm.
Let c : H ← B be a clause selected from CLSTACK.
1. mode(H) ∈ {(In, In), (In,Out)}.
In such a case each input position in the head of c is ground because before
c was added to CLSTACK its head was unified with a well-moded atom from
16
GOALSTACK. By well-modedness of clauses, each variable V in the output
position of the head of c, such that V /∈ VarIn(H), must occur in B. Now,
assume that ∃B′ ⊆ FACTSTACK such that B and B′ unify with mgu θ and that
Hθ is not ground. Then, it must be that ∃B ∈ B′ such that B is not ground. But,
by the inductive hypothesis, each B ∈ B′ is ground. This is a contradiction so
Hθ must be ground.
2. mode(H) = (Out , In).
If mode(H) = (Out , In), then by Definition 3.1 (Well-Formed) Out(H) is
ground and by Definition 3.2 (Traceable,Depositary) either In(H) is ground,
or In(H) is a variable and In(H) = In(B1) where B1 is the first atom in B.
Now, assume that ∃B′ ⊆ FACTSTACK such that B and B′ unify with mgu θ and
that Hθ is not ground. Then, it must be that ∃B ∈ B′ such that B is not ground.
But, by the inductive hypothesis, each B ∈ B′ is ground. This is a contradiction
so Hθ must be ground. 
Theorem 4.5 (completeness) Let P be a state and then FACTSTACK,GOALSTACK
be the result of executing LIAR on P and a given well-moded goal. Then ∀C ∈
GOALSTACK, if ∃ a successful SLD derivation δ : C θ−→P (P)  thenC θ→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof. We prove a more general proposition:
Proposition Let P be a state and then FACTSTACK,GOALSTACK be the result of
executing LIAR on P and a given well-moded goal. Then ∀C ∈ GOALSTACK:
1. if mode(C) = (In,Out) or mode(C) = (In, In) and ∃ successful SLD deriva-
tion δ : C θ−→P (P)  then C
θ
→֒ FACTSTACK,
2. if mode(C) = (Out, In) and ∃ successful SLD derivation D θ−→P (P) , where
D is an atom connected to C then D θ→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation.
Base case: length = 1.
1. Assume that δ : C θ−→P (P)  has length 1. In such a case there exists
a clause c : C′. ∈ P such that mgu(C,C′) = θ. Note that mode(C) ∈
{(In,Out), (In, In)}. This means that clause c is stored at issuer(C) (the mode
is assigned to the predicate symbol and this is the same for C and C′).
Since C ∈ GOALSTACK then:
(a) first, at some step in Phase 1 of the algorithm, clause c was fetched at
issuer(C′) and C′θ was added to CLSTACK;
(b) then, at some step in Phase 2 of the algorithm,C′θ was added to FACTSTACK.
Since mgu(C,C′) = θ the thesis follows.
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2. Assume that δ : D θ−→P (P)  has length 1. Then there exists a clause d :
D′. ∈ P such that mgu(D,D′) = θ. Note that since D is a well-moded
goal, recipient(D) = recipient(D′). Since D is connected to C, mode(D) =
(Out, In) and d is stored at recipient(C) = recipient(D). Consequently, since
C ∈ GOALSTACK:
(a) at some step in Phase 1 of the algorithm clause dwas fetched at recipient(D′)
and added to CLSTACK;
(b) then, at some point in Phase 2, D′ was added to FACTSTACK.
Since mgu(D,D′) = θ the thesis follows.
Inductive case:
1. Assume that there exists an SLD derivation δ : C θ−→P (P) , such that length(δ) =
m > 1. Then, by well-known result from the theory of Logic Programming
(switching lemma) there exists a clause c : H ← B1, . . . , Bn and substitutions
γ0, γ1, . . . , γn such that:
• γ0 = mgu(C,H),
• ∀i ∈ [1, n] there exists a successful derivation δi : Biγ0 · · ·γi−1
γi
−→P (P)
 such that length(δi) < m with c.a.s. γi,
• Cθ is a variant of Hγ0γ1 · · · γn.
Since mode(C) ∈ {(In,Out), (In, In)} then clause c is stored at issuer(C),
and, since C ∈ GOALSTACK at some step in Phase 1 of the algorithm, c is
fetched at issuer(C) and cγ0 is added to CLSTACK. We need to prove the fol-
lowing claim:
Claim 1 For each i ∈ [1, n], (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof of Claim 1. The proof is by induction on i:
• Basic case: i = 1.
Notice that B1γ0 is well-moded. Since B1γ0
γ1
−→P (P)  is a derivation





Assume (B1, . . . , Bi−1)γ0
γ1···γi−1
→֒ FACTSTACK. Notice that, by Corol-
lary 2.5, Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1 is well-moded. Since Biγ0γ1 · · ·γi−1
γi
−→P (P)
 is a derivation of length < m then, by inductive hypothesis on the length
of the derivation, Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1
γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
Notice that, by Corollary 2.4, Biγ0, . . . , γi is ground. By composing the
substitutions, (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK, so that the claim fol-
lows. 
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Now, from Claim 1 and the fact that c ∈ P , it follows that at some stage of
Phase 1 of the algorithm, Hγ0γ1 · · ·γn was added to FACTSTACK. Since γ0 =
mgu(C,H), it follows that C θ→֒ FACTSTACK, where θ = γ0γ1 · · ·γn.
2. Assume that there exists a successful SLD derivation δ : D θ−→P (P) , such
that length(δ) = m > 1. Then, by well-known result from the theory of Logic
Programming (switching lemma) there exists a clause c : H ← B1, . . . , Bn and
substitutions γ0, γ1, . . . , γn such that:
• γ0 = mgu(D,H),
• ∀i ∈ [1, n] there exists a successful derivation δi : Biγ0 · · ·γi−1
γi
−→P (P)
 such that length(δi) < m with c.a.s. γi,
• Dθ is a variant of Hγ0γ1 · · · γn.
Since mode(D) = (Out, In) then either:
2a In(H) contains a ground term a and c is stored at a, or
2b In(H) is a variable. In such a case, there exists a prefix B1, . . . , Bk of
B1, . . . , Bn satisfying the conditions of Definition 3.2, and c is stored at
issuer(Bk) = Out(Bk).
Case 2a.
Since C ∈ GOALSTACK and recipient(C) = recipient(H) = recipient(D) then
at some stage of Phase 1 of the algorithm c is fetched at recipient(C) and added
to CLSTACK. We need to prove the following claim:
Claim 2 For each i ∈ [1, n], (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof of Claim 2. The proof is by induction on i:
• Basic case: i = 1.
Notice that B1γ0 is well-moded. Since B1γ0
γ1
−→P (P)  is a derivation





Assume (B1, . . . , Bi−1)γ0
γ1···γi−1
→֒ FACTSTACK. Notice again that, by
Corollary 2.5,Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1 is well-moded. SinceBiγ0γ1 · · · γi−1
γi
−→P (P)
 is a derivation of length < m then, by inductive hypothesis on the length
of the derivation, Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1
γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
By composing the substitutions, (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK, so
that the claim follows. 
Now, from Claim 2 and the fact that c ∈ P , it follows that at some stage
of Phase 1 of the algorithm, Hγ0γ1 · · · γn was added to FACTSTACK. Since
γ0 = mgu(D,H), it follows that D
θ
→֒ FACTSTACK, where θ = γ0γ1 · · ·γn. 
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Case 2b.
We first prove the following claim:
Claim 3 For i ∈ [1, k], (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof of Claim 3. The proof is by induction on i:
• Basic case: i = 1.
Notice that B1γ0 is well-moded, mode(B1) = (Out, In), and that
recipient(B1) = recipient(C) = recipient(D). Since C ∈ GOALSTACK,
and since B1γ0
γ1
−→P (P)  is a derivation of length < m, by inductive




Assume (B1, . . . , Bi−1)γ0
γ1···γi−1
→֒ FACTSTACK. Notice again that, by
Corollary 2.5, Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1 is well-moded. Since, by inductive hypoth-
esis on the length of the derivation, Bi−1γ0 · · ·γi−2
γi−1
→֒ FACTSTACK, at
some point of Phase 2 of the algorithm the following dummy clause was
added to CLSTACK:
dm : dummy(X, issuer(Bi−1γ0 · · · γi−1)):-
dummy(X, issuer(Bi−1γ0 · · · γi−1)).
Notice that mode(dummy) = (Out, In) and that dm is well-moded. No-
tice also, that Biγ0 · · ·γi−1 is connected to
dummy(X, issuer(Bi−1γ0 · · · γi−1)). This implies that at some point of
Phase 1 of the algorithm all the clauses moded (Out, In) were fetched at
recipient(Biγ0 · · · γi−1) and added to CLSTACK.
Now, since Biγ0γ1 · · ·γi−1
γi
−→P (P)  is a derivation of length < m
then, by inductive hypothesis on the length of the derivation,
Biγ0γ1 · · · γi−1
γi
→֒ FACTSTACK. By composing the substitutions,
(B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK, and the claim follows. 
Notice that as an immediate consequence of Claim 3, at some point of Phase 1
of the algorithm all the (Out, In) clauses from issuer(Bkγ0 · · ·γk) were added
to CLSTACK. In particular, clause c was added to CLSTACK.
For the remaining atoms of the body we prove the following claim.
Claim 4 For i ∈ [k + 1, n], (Bk+1, . . . , Bi)γ0 · · · γk
γk+1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK.
Proof of Claim 4. The proof is again by induction on i:
• Basic case: i = k + 1.
Notice thatBk+1γ0 · · · γk is well-moded. SinceBk+1γ0 · · ·γk
γk+1
−→P (P) 
is a derivation of length < m, by inductive hypothesis on the length of the
derivation





Assume (Bk+1, . . . , Bi−1)γ0 · · · γk
γk+1···γi−1
→֒ FACTSTACK. Notice again
that, by Corollary 2.4, Biγ0 · · ·γkγk+1 · · · γi−1 is well-moded. Since
Biγ0 · · ·γkγk+1 · · · γi−1
γi
−→P (P)  is a derivation of length < m then,
by inductive hypothesis on the length of the derivation,
Biγ0 · · ·γk · · · γi−1
γi
→֒ FACTSTACK. By composing the substitutions,
(Bk+1, . . . , Bi)γ0 · · ·γk
γk+1···γi
→֒ FACTSTACK, so that the claim follows.

From Claim 3 and Claim 4 it follows that for i ∈ [1, n] (B1, . . . , Bi)γ0
γ1···γi
→֒
FACTSTACK. From this and from the fact that c ∈ P it follows that at some
stage of Phase 1 of the algorithm,Hγ0γ1 · · · γnwas added to FACTSTACK. Since
γ0 = mgu(D,H), it follows that D
θ
→֒ FACTSTACK, where θ = γ0γ1 · · ·γn. 

Theorem 5.3 Let S be an RT0 policy. Then SP(S) |= m(a, r, d) iff T (S) |= r(a, d).
Proof. See the Appendix. Take an RT statement a.r ← d. The meaning of this
statement is given by the clause SP(a.r ← d) = m(a, r, d). On the other hand,
its CoreTuLiP equivalent is given by T (a.r ← d) = r(a, d). Generalising this, we
now define a mapping sp_to_tulip which transforms atoms of the form m(x, y, z) in
atoms of the form y(x, z) (the mapping is extended to clauses and programs in the
obvious way). It is easy to see that if (1) m/3 is the only predicate symbol defined in
program P , and if (2) each second argument of each atom occurring in P is ground,
then sp_to_tulip is only a syntactic mapping, and that for each ground atom A, we have
that P |= A iff sp_to_tulip(P ) |= sp_to_tulip(A). Now, since for any SP(S) we have
that (1) and (2) are both satisfied, and since sp_to_tulip(SP(S)) = T (S), the thesis
follows. 
Proposition 5.4 Let c be an RT0 credential.
(a) if c is stored at a then T (c) is also stored at a.
(b) if c is a well typed then T (c) is traceable.
Proof. (a) This is a direct consequence of Definition 5.2 and Definition 3.2. Con-
cerning (b), table 2 shows all possible well typed RT0 credentials, their CoreTuLiP
counterparts and the corresponding modes. Using Definition 3.2 it is straightforward
to check that for each well typed RT0 credential shown in Table 2 the corresponding




r, r1, and r2 such
that the credential
is well typed
Translation to CoreTuLiP (T (c)) Modes
r r1 r2 r r1 r2
a.r ← d ITA r(a, d). (I,O)
STA r(a, d). (O,I)
ITD r(a, d). (I,I)
a.r ← b.r1 ITA ITA r(a,X) :− r1(b,X). (I,O) (I,O)
STA STA r(a,X) :− r1(b,X). (O,I) (O,I)
ITD ITA r(a,X) :− r1(b,X). (I,I) (I,O)
ITD ITD r(a,X) :− r1(b,X). (I,I) (I,I)
ITD STA r(a,X) :− r1(b,X). (I,I) (O,I)
a.r ← a.r1.r2 ITA ITA ITA r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r2(Y,X). (I,O) (I,O) (I,O)
STA STA STA r(a,X) :− r2(Y,X), r1(a, Y ). (O,I) (O,I) (O,I)
ITD ITA ITA r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r2(Y,X). (I,I) (I,O) (I,O)
ITD ITA ITD r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r2(Y,X). (I,I) (I,O) (I,I)
ITD ITA STA r(a,X) :− r1(a, Y ), r2(Y,X). (I,I) (I,O) (O,I)
ITD ITD STA r(a,X) :− r2(Y,X), r1(a, Y ). (I,I) (I,I) (O,I)
a.r ← b1.r1 ∩ b2.r2 ITA ITA ITA r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,O) (I,O) (I,O)
ITA ITA ITD r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,O) (I,O) (I,I)
ITA ITA STA r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,O) (I,O) (O,I)
ITA ITD ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,O) (I,I) (I,O)
ITA STA ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,O) (O,I) (I,O)
STA STA STA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (O,I) (O,I) (O,I)
STA STA ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (O,I) (O,I) (I,O)
STA STA ITD r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (O,I) (O,I) (I,I)
STA ITA STA r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (O,I) (I,O) (O,I)
STA ITD STA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (O,I) (I,I) (O,I)
ITD ITA ITA r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,I) (I,O) (I,O)
ITD ITA ITD r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,I) (I,O) (I,I)
ITD ITA STA r(a,X) :− r1(b1,X), r2(b2,X). (I,I) (I,O) (O,I)
ITD ITD ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (I,I) (I,O)
ITD STA ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (O,I) (I,O)
ITD STA STA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (O,I) (O,I)
ITD STA ITA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (O,I) (I,O)
ITD STA ITD r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (O,I) (I,I)
ITD ITD STA r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (I,I) (O,I)
ITD ITD ITD r(a,X) :− r2(b2,X), r1(b1,X). (I,I) (I,I) (I,I)
Table 2: Well typed RT0 credentials and the corresponding CoreTuLiP traceable
clauses their modes (I=In, O=Out)
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